

APPEAL NO. 032910
FILED DECEMBER 30, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 13, 2003. The hearing officer decided that the respondent's (claimant herein) compensable injury of _____, does extend to and included a herniated disc at C5-6, and that the claimant had disability from April 17, 2003, continuing through May 17, 2003. The appellant (carrier herein) files a request for review in which it argues that the decision of the hearing officer was not supported by the evidence. There is no response from the claimant to the carrier's request for review in the appeal file.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). The carrier essentially makes the same factual arguments on appeal that it made at the hearing. Applying the standard of review outlined above, we find no reversible error.

The sole basis of the carrier's challenge to the hearing officer's disability finding is that the hearing officer erred in his extent-of-injury determination. Having affirmed the hearing officer's extent-of-injury determination, we likewise affirm his resolution of the disability issue.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Margaret L. Turner
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge